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Good lawyers are good critics. The nature of their discipline makes
this skill necessary, and the content of their work brings it inevitably
to bear upon doctrines and concepts laboriously constructed by their
predecessors. In approaching questions involving collective bargaining
and public employment, union lawyers and academic commentators
have for some years been criticizing the concept of the sovereignty
of the public employer, and its offspring, the doctrine of the illegal
delegation of power. These two lawyer-made constructs once had im-
posed formidable obstacles to collective bargaining in the public sector
t This paper was prepared as part of a larger project on Collective Bargaining and
Public Employment which is being conducted by the Brookings Institution with financial
support from the Ford Foundation. The views are the authors' and are not presented as
those of the officers, trustees, or staff members of the Brookings Institution or of the
Ford Foundation.
An earlier draft of this paper was read by several of our social science colleagues. We
are grateful to Professors Ward S. Bowman, Herbert Kaufman, Stanley Lebergott. Charles
E. Lindblom, Peter M. Mieszkowski and Martin Shubik for their helpful comments.
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brand, The Public Sector in FRoNTIE OF CoLLEcrrvE BA GAiNING 125 (J. Dunlop & N.
Chamberlain eds. 1967); Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employ-
ment, 67 MicE. L. RiEv. 943 (1969); Morris, Public Policy and the Law Relating to Col-
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subject are, City of New York v. DeLury, 23 N.Y.2d 175, 243 N.E.2d 128 (1963). appeal
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of our economy.' But this criticism, vastly strengthened by the chang-
ing nature of government employment and the ever visible example
of collective bargaining in the private sector, has led to a liberalized
common law and a growing body of enacted law and has reduced to
a whisper the counsel of restraint voiced by these constructs.
2
Consider sovereignty, that concept so elusive as an analytical tool,
yet so fundamental to all notions of government. A law dictionary
advises that it is the "supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by
which any independent state is governed . . . ."3 Since collective bar-
gaining in the private sector is believed by many to be a system of
countervailing power-a means, that is, by which the power of em-
ployees is increased to offset that of employers-one might easily see its
establishment in the public sector as an infringement on governmental
power and the sovereignty of the state itself. Viewing the "supreme,
absolute, and uncontrollable" sovereign in its role as an employer,
therefore, Franklin Roosevelt understandably said, "A strike of public
employees manifests nothing less than an intent on their part to ob-
struct the operations of government until their demands are satisfied.
Such action looking toward the paralysis of government by those who
have sworn to support it is unthinkable and intolerable."
4
But, to the lawyer-critics, sovereignty seems a weak reed when the
private analogy is pressed. It was 1836 when a judge observed that if
collective bargaining in the private sector were "tolerated, the consti-
I. For the flavor of the rhetoric, see Railway Mail Ass'n v. Murphy, 180 Misc. 868,
875, 44 N.Y.S.2d 601, 607 (Sup. Ct. 1943), rev'd on other grounds sub noa. Railway Mall
Ass'n v. Corsi, 267 App. Div. 470, afJ'd, 293 N.Y. 315, 56 N.E.2d 721, afj'd, 326 U.S. 88
(1946):
To tolerate or recognize any combination of civil service em ployees of the govern-
ment as a labor organization or union is not only incompatible with the spirit of
democracy, but inconsistent with every principle upon which our government is
founded. Nothing is more dangerous to public welfare than to admit that hired ser-
vants of the State can dictate to the government the hours, the wages and conditions
under which they will carry on essential services vital to the welfare, safety and secu-
rity of the citizen. To admit as true that government employees have power to halt
or check the functions of government, unless their demands are satisfied, is to transfer
to them all legislative, executive and judicial power. Nothing would be more ridic-
ulous.
180 Misc. at 875.
2. The most important of the "liberal" common law decisions is the early Connecticut
case of Norwalk Teachers Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951). Among
the states recently enacting comprehensive public employee relations acts are Massachu-
setts, MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 149 §§ 423.201-216 (1967); and New York, N.Y. CIVIL SERV.
LAW §§ 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
3. BLAcK's LAW DIMcTONARY 1643 (3d ed. 1933).
4. Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to L. C. Stewart, President, National Fcd'n of
Fed. Employees, Aug. 16, 1937, cited in Vogel, What About the' Rights of the Public
Employee?, 1 LAB. L.J. 604, 612.
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tutional control over our affairs would pass away from the people at
large, and become vested in the hands of conspirators. We should
have a new system of government, and our rights [would] be placed
at the disposal of a voluntary and self-constituted association."s Such
sovereignty-related assertions are no longer thought to have applicabil-
ity to the private sector, for private collective bargaining has served
as the nation's labor policy for more than a generation-not without
criticism, but surely without any sign of the apocalypse. And so, con-
clude the critics, the notion of sovereignty as a bar to collective bar-
gaining is not a concept peculiar to the public employer, but is merely
an anti-union make-weight left over from an earlier day when the
law was hostile to all collective bargaining.
Sovereignty must also seem to the critics too elusive and too remote
a concept to be of practical significance in the fashioning of labor
policy. The issue is not, they say, whether government's power is
"supreme," but how government as an employer ought to exercise
that power. And the concept of sovereignty, while it locates the source
of ultimate authority, does not seem to speak to that issue.
The doctrine of the illegal delegation of power, however, does ad-
dress itself to that question, for it is a constitutional doctrine which
sometimes forbids government from sharing its powers with others.0
The doctrine of illegal delegation commands that certain discretionary
decisions be made solely on the basis of the judgment of a designated
official. And because a great deal of shared control is implicit in any
scheme of collective bargaining, the delegation doctrine has been em-
ployed in the past to prevent all bargaining between government and
its employees. Even today it serves as a basis for establishing limits
on the scope of collective bargaining in public employment. Often sub-
jects of vital interest to employees are subjects that cannot be resolved
through the collective bargaining process, because they are by law
non-delegable.7 In some jurisdictions, moreover, the delegation doc-
trine places in doubt the binding force of bargains struck;8 and in
5. The Case of the Twenty Journeymen Tailors, People v. Faulkner, N.Y. (1836),
Courier and Enquirer, May 31, 1836, reproduced in 4 CoNm.zs & GILMIOR, A DOC.rN-
TARY HISTORY OF AmEFmCAN INDUSTRIAL SocEry 315, 322 (1910).
6. See Muford v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, reprinted in C. RP.vE, LAnoRUNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE LAw 161, 163 (1946), affd, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745
(1946).
7. See, e.g., Executive Order 10988, Employee-Management Cooperation in FederalService, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (1962). Cf. In re Farmingdale Classroom Teachers, 63 LR.R.M.
2761 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1968).
8. See Transit Union v. Public Transit Bd., 430 S.W.2d 107 (Texas Ct. Civ. App. 1968).
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others it is employed as an excuse for not bargaining even though
such bargaining is legally permissible.0
Again, however, the lawyer-critics press the analogy of the private
sector and again find the limiting doctrine an inadequate basis for a
distinction. Private employers from the beginning of American labor
history have insisted upon management prerogatives. Certain decisions
-their rhetoric claims-must be made by management alone and
cannot be subject to shared control.10 While the decisions at issue
have changed over the years-from wage rates to subcontracting, from
hours of work to automation-the assertion of management preroga-
tives has been the private sector's analogue to the illegal delegation of
power:" management is charged with the lawful responsibility for
making management decisions; the decision in question is a manage-
ment decision; it cannot be shared, for to share would be to give con-
trol to those without legal responsibility.'
2
In the private sector the establishment of collective bargaining is
itself a rejection of these arguments. Based on a belief that bargaining
is likely to be unfair when the individual employee is ranged against
the employer, and that "industrial democracy" is necessary to rescue
the employee from the psychological emasculation of modern indus-
try, collective bargaining inevitably entails shared control of "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment."
13 And there
is nothing in any realistic description of the management function to
9. Compare Regents v. Packing House Workers, 68 L.R.R.M. 2677 (Dist. Ct. Iowa
1968), with Fort Smith v. Council No. 88, AFSCME, 433 S.W.2d 153 (Ark. 1968).
10. Consider the following statement of Charles E. Wilson made in 1948 when he was
President of General Motors:
If we consider the ultimate result of this tendency to stretch collective bargaining
to comprehend any subject that a union leader may desire to bargain on, we come
out with the union leaders really running the economy of the country; but with no
legal or public responsibility and with no private employment except as they may
permit.
Under these conditions, the freedom of management to function properly without
interference in making its every-day decisions will be gradually restricted. The union
leaders-particularly where they have industry-wide power-will have the deciding
vote in all managerial decisions, or at least, will exercise a veto power that will stop
progress.
Only by defining and restricting collective bargaining to its proper sphere can we
hope to save what we have come to know as our American system and keep It from
evolving into an alien form, imported from East of the Rhine ....
N. CHAMBERLAIN, THE LABOR SECTOR 842 (1965).
11. See, e.g., Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 836
U.S. 960 (1949); Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, 879 U.S. 203 (1964).
12. The earliest American labor cases sometimes contained rhetoric of this sort. Con.
pare State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 72, 8 A. 890, 894 (1887), with The Philadelphia Cord-
wainers Case, Commonwealth v. Pullis (1806), 8 COMMONS & GILMORE, A DocwuMErrAY
HISTORY OF THE UNrED STATES 59, 229 (1910).
13. Labor-Management Relations Act § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
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require that the quoted language be given anything other than an
expansive reading.14 Given the conservative ideology of the American
labor movement, we need not fear that the unions will intrude on mat-
ters which in fact are "solely of interest to management." They are
hardly likely to expend their limited power in disputes over issues
having no impact on the worker. Nor are there lines to be drawn on
grounds of economic efficiency. Since the efficiency of an employer is
reflected in the cost of his product, whether that cost is imposed
through high wages or a restriction on the introduction of machinery,
is a matter of indifference to society. Thus, in our system of private
collective bargaining, economic power and the parties' desires are the
only rational determinants of what matters should be subjects of
bargaining.' 5
Therefore, ask the lawyer-critics, is not the doctrine of illegal delega-
tion in the public sector to be treated in the same way as the manage-
ment prerogatives question in the private?' And are not the reasons
for collective bargaining in the public sector the same as those in the
private?
While there seems to be considerable justification for viewing the
public employee as the functional equivalent of the private employee,
we believe collective bargaining cannot be fully transplanted from the
private sector to the public. The reasons why this is so are reasons,
moreover, that should lead lawyers to a rather more sympathetic treat-
ment of delegation and sovereignty. Our argument begins with the
rationale for collective bargaining in the private sector.
I. The Claims for Collective Bargaining in the Private Sector
Those who deny the validity of the claims for collective bargaining
in the private sector will surely not find those claims to have merit
in the public. We do not intend to debate the merits of these claims.
We must, however, if we are fully to test our thesis that a full trans-
plant of collective bargaining to the public sector is inappropriate,
assume a minimal validity of the claims that are made for it in the
private.
14. See generally H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND TE L .GAL PROCESS 63-90 (1963).
15. See Cox and Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargaining by the National Labor
Relations Board, 63 HARv. L. REv. 389 (1950); CoAMtrrs FOR Eco.xwoic DEVE.LOPM..
THE PUBLIC INmnSr IN NATIONAL LABOR POLCY 82 (1961).
16. In the private area, many subjects, in fact, have been held not to be mandatory
subjects of bargaining. As to non-mandatory subjects, neither employer nor union has a
duty to bargain. Indeed, to press bargaining about such a subject is itself an unfair labor
practice. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
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Four claims then, are made for private-sector collective bargaining.
First, it is a way to achieve industrial peace. The point was put as
early as 1902 by the Industrial Commission:
The chief advantage which comes from the practice of periodically
determining the conditions of labor by collective bargaining di-
rectly between employers and employees is that thereby each side
obtains a better understanding of the actual state of the industry,
of the conditions which confront the other side, and of the mo-
tives which influence it. Most strikes and lockouts would not
occur if each party understood exactly the position of the other.
1
Second, collective bargaining is a way of achieving industrial democ-
racy-that is, participation by workers in their own governance. It is
the industrial counterpart of the contemporary demand for commu-
nity participation.'
8
Third, unions that bargain collectively with employers represent
workers in the political arena as well. And political representation
through interest groups is one of the most important types of political
representation that the individual can have. Government at all levels
acts in large part in response to the demands made upon it by the
groups to which its citizens belong.'9
Fourth, and most important, as a result of a belief in the unequal
bargaining power of employers and employees, collective bargaining
is claimed to be a needed substitute for individual bargaining.20
Monopsony-a buyer's monopoly,21 in this case a buyer of labor-is
alleged to exist in many situations and to create unfair contracts of
17. FINAL REPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 844 (1902).
18. See, e.g., testimony of Louis D. Brandeis before the Commission on Industrial
Relations, Jan. 23, 1915, S. Doc. No. 415, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 7657-81 (1916).
19. See generally H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 215-38 (1968).
20. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 800 (1902):
It is quite generally recognized that the growth of great aggregations of capital
under the control of single groups of men, which is so prominent a feature of the
economic development of recent years, necessitates a corresponding aggregation of
workingmen into unions, which may be able also to act as units. It is readily per-
ceived that the position of the single workman, face to face with one of our great
modem combinations, such as the United States Steel Corporation, is a position of
very great weakness. The workman has one thing to sell-his labor. He has perhaps
devoted years to the acquirement of a skill which gives his labor power a relatively
high value, so long as he is able to put it to use in combination with certain mate-
rials and machinery. A single legal person has, to a very great extent, the control of
such machinery, and in particular of such materials. Under such conditions there is
little competition for the workman's labor. Control of the means of production gives
power to dictate to the workingman upon what terms he shall make use of them.
21. Our use of the term monopsony is not intended to suggest a labor market with a
single employer. Rather we mean any market condition in which the terms and condi-
tions of employment are generally below that which would have existed if tile employers
behaved competitively.
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labor as a result of individual bargaining. While this, in turn, may
not mean that workers as a class and over time get significantly less
than they should-because monopsony is surely not a general condi-
tion but is alleged to exist only in a number of particular circum-
stances22  it may mean that the terms and conditions of employment
for an individual or group of workers at a given period of time and
in given circumstances may be unfair. What tends to insure fairness
in the aggregate and over the long run is the discipline of the market.2
But monopsony, if it exists, can work substantial injustice to indi-
viduals. Governmental support of collective bargaining represents the
nation's response to a belief that such injustice occurs. Fairness be-
tween employee and employer in wages, hours, and terms and condi-
tions of employment is thought more likely to be ensured where
private ordering takes the collective form.24
There are, however, generally recognized social costs resulting from
this resort to collectivism. 2 5 In the private sector these costs are pri-
marily economic, and the question is, given the benefits of collective
bargaining as an institution, what is the nature of the economic costs?
Economists who have turned their attention to this question are legion,
and disagreement among them monumental.2 The principal concerns
are of two intertwined sorts. One is summarized by Professor Albert
Rees of Princeton:
If the union is viewed solely in terms of its effect on the econ-
omy, it must in my opinion be considered an obstacle to the
22. There is by no means agreement that monopsony is a significant factor. For a
theoretical discussion, see F. MACHLUP, THE POLrrICAL ECONOMY OF MONOPOLY 333-79
(1952); for an empirical study, see R. BuNrNG, EMPLOYER CONCE.mzoNR IO N LOCAL LACOR
MAxrs (1962).
23. See, e.g., L. REYNOLDS, LABOR ECONOMICS ANo LABOR RELATIONS 18-19 (3d ed. 1961).
To the extent that monopsonistic conditions exist at an) particular time one would
expect them to be transitory. For even if we assume a high degree of labor immobility,
a low wage level in a labor market will attract outside employers. Over time, therefore.
the benefits of monopsony seem to carry with them the seeds of its destruction. But the
time may seem a very long time in the life of any individual worker.
24. See, e.g., Labor-Management Relations Act § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
25. The monopsony justification views collective bargaining as a system of counter-
vailing power-that is, the collective power of the workers countcervails the bargaining
power of employers. See J. K. G.BpArr, ATMcUAN CAMrTALISM 121 ct seq. (1952). Accept-
ing the entire line of argument up to this point, however, collective bargaining neverthe-
less seems a crude device for meeting the monopsony problem, since there is no particular
reason to think that collective bargaining will be instituted where there is monopsony
(or that it is more likely to be instituted there). In some circumstances collective bar-
gaining may even raise wages above a "competitive" level. On the other hand, the col-
lective bargaining approach is no cruder than the law's general response to perceived
unfairness in the application of the freedom of contract doctrine. See H. AErs.uLNro.v,
supra note 14, at 26-38.
26. Compare, eg., Simons, Some Reflections on Syndicalisn, 52 J. OP PoL. Eco.N. 1
(1944), with, e.g., Lester, Reflections on the "Labor Monopoly" Issue, 55 J. oF PoL ECO..
513 (1947).
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optimum performance of our economic system. It alters the wage
structure in a way that impedes the growth of employment in
sectors of the economy where productivity and income are nat-
urally high and that leaves too much labor in low-income sectors
of the economy like southern agriculture and the least skilled
trades. It benefits most those workers who would in any case be
relatively well off, and while some of this gain may be at the
expense of the owners of capital, most of it must be at the ex-
pense of consumers and the lower-paid workers. Unions interfere
blatantly with the use of the most productive techniques in some
industries, and this effect is probably not offset by the stimulus to
higher productivity furnished by some other unions.
27
The other concern is stated in the 1967 Report of the Council of
Economic Advisors:
Vigorous competition is essential to price stability in a high
employment economy. But competitive forces do not and cannot
operate with equal strength in every sector of the economy. In in-
dustries where the number of competitors is limited, business
firms have a substantial measure of discretion in setting prices.
In many sectors of the labor market, unions and managements to-
gether have a substantial measure of discretion in setting wages.
The responsible exercise of discretionary power over wages and
prices can help to maintain general price stability. Its irresponsible
use can make full employment and price stability incompatible.
28
And the claim is that this "discretionary power" too often is exer-
cised "irresponsibly."
29
Disagreement among economists extends to the quantity as well as
to the fact of economic malfunctioning that properly is attributable to
collective bargaining.30 But there is no disagreement that at some
point the market disciplines or delimits union power. As we shall
see in more detail below,31 union power is frequently constrained by
the fact that consumers react to a relative increase in the price of a
product by purchasing less of it. As a result any significant real finan-
cial benefit, beyond that justified by an increase in productivity,
which accrues to workers through collective bargaining, may well
cause significant unemployment among union members. Because of
this employment-benefit relationship, the economic costs imposed by
27. A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 194-95 (1962).
28. COUNCIL OF EcoN. ADVISORS, 1967 ANNUAL REPORT 119 (1967).
29. See id. at 119-34. See generally J. SHEAHAN, TIE WAGE-PRICE GuWEPosrs (1967).
80. See, e.g., H. G. Ixvws, UNIONISM ND RELATIVE WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES (196),
and earlier studies discussed therein.
31. See pp. 1117-19 infra.
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collective bargaining as it presently exists in the private sector seem
inherently limited.3 2
II. The Claims for Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector
In the area of public employment the claims upon public policy
made by the need for industrial peace, industrial democracy and effec-
tive political representation point toward collective bargaining. This
is to say that three of the four arguments that support bargaining in
the private sector-to some extent, at least-press for similar arrange-
ments in the public sector.
Government is a growth industry, particularly state and municipal
government. While federal employment between 1963 and 1968 has
increased from 2.36 million to 2.73 million, state and local employ-
ment has risen from 6.87 to 9.42 million,33 and the increase continues
apace. With size comes bureaucracy, and with bureaucracy comes the
isolation and alienation of the individual worker. His manhood, like
that of his industrial counterpart, is threatened. Lengthening chains
of command necessarily depersonalize the employment relationship
and contribute to a sense of powerlessness on the part of the worker.
If he is to share in the governance of his employment relationship as
he does in the private sector, it must be through the device of repre-
sentation, which means unionization.34 Accordingly, just as the in-
crease in the size of economic units in private industry fostered
unionism, so the enlarging of governmental bureaucracy has encour-
aged public employees to look to collective action for a sense of control
over their employment destiny. The number of government em-
ployees, moreover, makes it plain that those employees are members
of an interest group which can organize for political representation
as well as for job participation.35
The pressures thus generated by size and bureaucracy lead inescap-
ably to disruption-to labor unrest-unless these pressures are recog-
nized and unless existing decision-making procedures are accommo-
dated to them. Peace in government employment too, the argument
32. See generally J. DUNLOP, WAGE DETERMINATION UNDER TRADE UNiONs 28-44 (1944);
Friedman, Some Comments on the Significance of Labor Unions for Economic Policy, in
TrE IMPACT OF THE UNION 204 (D. Wright ed. 1951).
33. LABOR RELATIONS YEARBoO K-1968, at 451 (1969).
34. See FINAL REPORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL COmm.issION 805 (1902); Summers, American
Legislation for Union Democracy, 25 'MOD. L. REv. 273, 275 (1962).
85. For the 'eary'" history, see S. SPERO, GOvEnx MrnNT AS EMPLOiE (1948).
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runs, can best be established by making union recognition and collec-
tive bargaining accepted public policy.3
Mfuch less clearly analogous to the private model, however, is the
unequal bargaining power argument. In the private sector that argu-
ment really has two aspects. The first, which we have just adumbrated,
is affirmative in nature. Monopsony is believed sometimes to result in
unfair individual contracts of employment. The unfairness may be re-
flected in wages, which are less than they would be if the market were
more nearly perfect, or in working arrangements which may lodge
arbitrary power in a foreman, i.e., power to hire, fire, promote, assign
or discipline without respect to substantive or procedural rules. A per-
sistent assertion, generating much heat, relates to the arbitrary exer-
cise of managerial power in individual cases. This assertion goes far
to explain the insistence of unions on the establishment in the labor
contract of rules, with an accompanying adjudicatory procedure, to
govern industrial life.
3 7
Judgments about the fairness of the financial terms of the public
employee's individual contract of employment are even harder to make
than for private sector workers. The case for the existence of private
employer monopsony, disputed as it is, asserts only that some private
sector employers in some circumstances have too much bargaining
power. In the public sector, the case to be proven is that the govern-
mental employer ever has such power. But even if this case could be
proven, market norms are at best attenuated guides to questions of
fairness. In employment as in all other areas, governmental decisions
are properly political decisions, and economic considerations are but
one criterion among many. Questions of fairness do not centrally re-
late to how much imperfection one sees in the market, but more to
how much imperfection one sees in the political process. "Low" pay
for teachers may be merely a decision-right or wrong, resulting from
the pressure of special interests or from a desire to promote the gen-
eral welfare-to exchange a reduction in the quality or quantity of
teachers for higher welfare payments, a domed stadium, etc. And we
are limited in our ability to make informed judgments about such
political decisions because of the understandable but unfortunate fact
that the science of politics has failed to supply us with either as ele-
gant or as reliable a theoretical model as has its sister discipline.
36. See, e.g., GOVERNOR'S ComimrrEE ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, FINAL REPORT 9
(State of N.Y. 1966).
37. See, e.g., N. CHAMBERLAIN, THE UNION CHALLENGE TO MANAGEMINT CONTROL 9,1
(1948).
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Nevertheless, employment benefits in the public sector may have
improved relatively more slowly than in the private sector during the
last three decades. An economy with a persistent inflationary bias
probably works to the disadvantage of those who must rely on legis-
lation for wage adjustments. 3s Moreover, while public employment
was once attractive for the greater job security and retirement benefits
it provided, quite similar protection is now available in many areas of
the private sector.39 On the other hand, to the extent that civil service,
or merit, systems exist in public employment and these laws are
obeyed, the arbitrary exercise of managerial power is substantially
reduced. Where it is reduced, a labor policy that relies on the in-
dividual employment contract must seem less unacceptable.
The second, or negative aspect of the unequal bargaining power
argument, relates to the social costs of collective bargaining. As we
have seen, the social costs of collective bargaining in the private sector
are principally economic, and seem inherently limited by market
forces. In the public sector, however, the costs seem to us economic
only in a very narrow sense and are on the whole political. It further
seems to us that, to the extent union power is delimited by market or
other forces in the public sector, these constraints do not come into
play nearly as quickly as in the private. An understanding of why this
is so requires further comparison between collective bargaining in the
two sectors.
III. The Private Sector Model
While the private sector is, of course, extraordinarily diverse, the
paradigm case is an industry which produces a product that is not
particularly essential to those who buy it and for which dissimilar
products can be substituted. Within the market or markets for this
product, most-but not all-of the producers must bargain with a
union representing their employees, and this union is generally the
same through the industry. A price rise of this product relative to others
will result in a decrease in the number of units of the product sold.
This in turn will result in a cutback in employment. And an increase
38. This is surely one reason which might explain the widely assumed fact that public
employees have fallen behind their private sector counterparts. See Stieber, Collectie
Bargaining in the Public Sector, CHAL.ENGS TO COLLECflVE BARCA.RriN 65, 69 (L. Uhnan
ed. 1967).
s9. See Taylor, Public Employment: Strike or Procedures, 20 IND. & LAD. RnE. REv.
617, 623-25 (1967).
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in price would be dictated by an increase in labor cost relative to out-
put, at least in most situations.4 0 Thus, the union is faced with some
sort of rough trade-off between, on the one hand, larger benefits for
some employees and unemployment for others, and on the other hand,
smaller benefits and more employment. Because unions are political
organizations, with a legal duty to represent all employees fairly,
41 and
with a treasury that comes from per capita dues, there is pressure on
the union to avoid the road that leads to unemployment.
4 2
This picture of the restraints that the market imposes on collective
bargaining settlements undergoes change as the variables change. On
the one hand, to the extent that there are non-union firms within a
product market, the impact of union pressure will be diminished by
the ability of consumers to purchase identical products from non-
union and, presumably, less expensive sources. On the other hand, to
the extent that union organization of competitors within the product
market is complete, there will be no such restraint and the principal
barriers to union bargaining goals will be the ability of a number of
consumers to react to a price change by turning to dissimilar but never-
theless substitutable products.
Two additional variables must be noted. First, where the demand
for an industry's product is rather insensitive to price-i.e., relatively
inelastic-and where all the firms in a product market are organized,
the union need fear less the employment-benefit trade-off, for the em-
ployer is less concerned about raising prices in response to increased
costs. By hypothesis, a price rise affects unit sales of such an employer
only minimally. Second, in an expanding industry, wage settlements
which exceed increases in productivity may not reduce union employ-
ment. They will reduce expansion, hence the employment effect will
be experienced only by workers who do not belong to the union. This
means that in the short run the politics of the employment-benefit
trade-off do not restrain the union in its bargaining demands.
In both of these cases, however, there are at least two restraints on
the union. One is the employer's increased incentive to substitute
machines for labor, a factor present in the paradigm case and all other
40. The cost increase may, of course, take some time to work through and appear as
a price increase. See A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF TaA.E UNIONS 107-09 (1962). In some
oligopolistic situations the firm may be able to raise prices after a wage increase without
suffering a significant decrease in sales.
41. Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
42. The pressure is sometimes resisted. Indeed, the United Mine Workers has chosen
more benefits for less employment. See generally M. BARTZ, THm UNION AND TII COAL
INDUSTRY (1955).
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cases as well. The other restraint stems from the fact that large sec-
tions of the nation are unorganized and highly resistant to unioniza-
tion.43 Accordingly, capital will seek non-union labor, and in this
way the market will discipline the organized sector.
The employer, in the paradigm case and in all variations of it, is
motivated primarily by the necessity to maximize profits (and this is
so no matter how political a corporation may seem to be). He there-
fore is not inclined (absent an increase in demand for his product) to
raise prices and thereby suffer a loss in profits, and he is organized
to transmit and represent the market pressures described above. Gen-
erally he will resist, and resist hard, union demands that exceed in-
creases in productivity, for if he accepts such demands he may be
forced to raise prices. Should he be unsuccessful in his resistance too
often, and should it cost him too much, he can be expected to put
his money and energy elsewhere.44
What all this means is that the social costs imposed by collective
bargaining are economic costs; that usually they are limited by power-
ful market restraints; and that these restraints are visible to anyone
who is able to see the forest for the trees.
4 5
IV. The Public Sector Model
The paradigm case in the public sector is a municipality with an
elected board of aldermen, and an elected mayor who bargains
(through others) with unions representing the employees of the city.
He bargains also, of course, with other permanent and ad hoc interest
groups making claims upon government (business groups, save-the-
park committees, neighborhood groups, etc.). Indeed, the decisions
that are made may be thought of roughly as a result of interactions
and accommodations among these interest groups, as influenced by per-
ceptions about the attitudes of the electorate, and by the goals and
programs of the mayor and his aldermanic board.40
43. See Trends and Changes in Union Membership, 89 MoeMILY LAD. REV. 510-13
(1966); Bernstein. The Growth of American Unions 1945-1960, 2 LAB. Hisr. 131 (1961).
44. And the law would protect him in this. Indeed, it would protect him if he were
moved by an anti-union animus as well as by valid economic considerations. See Textile
Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
Of course, where fixed costs are large relative to variable costs, it may be difficult for
an employer to extricate himself.
45. This does not mean, of course, that collective bargaining in the private sector is
free of social costs. See pp. 1113-14 supra. It means only that the costs are necessarily
limited by the discipline of the market.
46. See generally R. DAHL, WHO GovERNs? D.tocRAcv AND PoanR IN AN A.,acAN
Crry (1961). On interest theory generally, see D. TRU.tAN, Tim GovERN.mhAt. Poc.ss
(1955).
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Decisions that cost the city money are generally paid for from taxes
and, less often, by borrowing. Not only are there many types of taxes,
but also there are several layers of government which may make tax
revenue available to the city; federal and state as well as local funds
may be employed for some purposes. Formal allocation of money for
particular uses is made through the city's budget, which may have
within it considerable room for adjustments. 47 Thus, a union will
bargain hard for as large a share of the budget as it thinks it possibly
can obtain, and beyond this to force a tax increase if it deems that
possible.
In the public sector too, the market operates. In the long run, the
supply of labor is a function of the price paid for labor by the public
employer relative to what workers earn elsewhere.48 This is some as-
surance that public employees in the aggregate-with or without col-
lective bargaining-are not paid too little. The case for employer
monopsony, moreover, may be much weaker in the public sector than
it is in the private. First, to the extent that most public employees
work in urban areas, as they probably do, there may often be a number
of substitutable and competing private and public employers in the
labor market. When that is the case, there can be little monopsony
power.49 Second, even if public employers occasionally have monopsony
power, governmental policy is determined only in part by economic
criteria, and there is no assurance, as there is in the private sector
where the profit motive prevails, that the power will be exploited.
As we have seen, market-imposed unemployment is an important
restraint on unions in the private sector. In the public sector, the
trade-off between benefits and employment seems much less important.
Government does not generally sell a product the demand for which
is closely related to price. There usually are not close substitutes for
the products and services provided by government and the demand
for them is inelastic. Such market conditions are, as we have seen,
favorable to unions in the private sector because they permit the
acquisition of benefits without the penalty of unemployment, subject
to the restraint of non-union competitors, actual or potential. But no
47. See, e.g., W. SAYRE & H. KAUFMAN, GOVERNING NEv YORK CITY 366-72 (1960).
48. Cf. M. MosKow, TEACHERS AND UNIONS 79-86 (1966).
49. This is based on the reasonable but not unchallengeable assumption that the
number of significant employers in a labor market is related to the existence of monop-
sony. See R. BUNTING, EMPLOYER CONCENTRATION IN LOCAL LABOR MARKErs 3-14 (1962).
The greater the number of such employers in a labor market, the greater the departure
from the classic case of the monopsony of the single employer. The number of employers
would clearly seem to affect their ability to make and enforce a collusive wage agreement.
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such restraint limits the demands of public employee unions. Because
much government activity is, and must be, a monopoly, product com-
petition, non-union or otherwise, does not exert a downward pressure
on prices and wages. Nor will the existence of a pool of labor ready
to work for a wage below union scale attract new capital and create
a new, and competitively less expensive, governmental enterprise. The
fear of unemployment, however, can serve as something of a restrain-
ing force in two situations. First, if the cost of labor increases, the city
may reduce the quality of the service it furnishes by reducing em-
ployment. For example, if teachers' salaries are increased, it may
decrease the number of teachers and increase class size. However, the
ability of city government to accomplish such a change is limited not
only by union pressure, but also by the pressure of other affected
interest groups in the community.50 Political considerations, there-
fore, may cause either no reduction in employment or services, or a
reduction in an area other than that in which the union members
work. Both the political power exerted by the beneficiaries of the
services, who are also voters, and the power of the public employee
union as a labor organization, then, combine to create great pressure
on political leaders either to seek new funds or to reduce municipal
services of another kind. Second, if labor costs increase, the city may,
even as a private employer would, seek to replace labor with machines.
The absence of a profit motive, and a political concern for unemploy-
ment, however, may be a deterrent in addition to the deterrent of
union resistance. The public employer which decides it must limit
employment because of unit labor costs will likely find that the
politically easiest decision is to restrict new hires, rather than to lay
off current employees.
Even if we are right that a close relationship between increased
economic benefits and unemployment does not exist as a significant
deterrent to unions in the public sector, might not the argument be
made that in some sense the taxpayer is the public sector's functional
equivalent of the consumer? If taxes become too high, the taxpayer
can move to another community. While it is generally much easier
for a consumer to substitute products than for a taxpayer to substitute
communities, is it not fair to say that, at the point at which a tax
increase will cause so many taxpayers to move that it will produce
less total revenue, the market disciplines or restrains union and public
employer in the same way and for the same reasons that the market
50. Organized parent groups, for example.
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disciplines parties in the private sector? Moreover, does not the
analogy to the private sector suggest that it is legitimate in an eco-
nomic sense for unions to push government to the point of substitut-
ability?
Several factors suggest that the answer to this latter question is at
best indeterminate, and that the question of legitimacy must be judged
not by economic, but by political criteria.
In the first place, there is no theoretical reason-economic or politi-
cal-to suppose that it is desirable for a governmental entity to liqui-
date its taxing power, to tax up to the point where another tax
increase will produce less revenue because of the number of people
it drives to different communities. In the private area, profit maximiza-
tion is a complex concept, but its approximation generally is both a
legal requirement and socially useful as a means of allocating re-
sources. 51 The liquidation of taxing power seems neither imperative
nor useful.
Second, consider the complexity of the tax structure and the way in
which different kinds of taxes (property, sales, income) fall differently
upon a given population. Consider, moreover, that the taxing author-
ity of a particular governmental entity may be limited (a municipality
may not have the power to impose an income tax). What is necessarily
involved, then, is principally the redistribution of income by govern-
ment rather than resource allocation,52 and questions of income redis-
tribution surely are essentially political questions.
5 3
For his part, the mayor in our paradigm case will be disciplined
not by a desire to maximize profits, but by a desire-in some cases at
least-to do a good job (to effectuate his programs), and in virtually
all cases either to be reelected or to move to a better elective office.
What he gives to the union must be taken from some other interest
group or from taxpayers. His is the job of coordinating these compet-
ing claims while remaining politically viable. And that coordination
will be governed by the relative power of the competing interest
groups. Our inquiry, therefore, must turn to the question of how
51. See generally R. DORFMAN, PRICES AND MARKETS (1967).
52. In the private sector what is involved is principally resource allocation rather than
income redistribution. Income redistribution occurs to the extent that unions are able to
increase wages at the expense of profits, but the extent to which this actually happens
would seem to be limited. It also occurs to the extent that unions, by limiting employ.
ment in the union sector through maintenance of wages above a competitive level, In-
crease the supply of labor in the non-union sector and thereby depress wages there.
53. In the private sector the political question was answered when the National Labor
Relations Act was passed: the benefits of collective bargaining (with the strike) outweigh
the social costs.
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much power public employee unions will exercise if the full private
model of collective bargaining is adopted in the public sector.
V. Public Employee Strikes and the Political Process
Although the market does not discipline the union in the public
sector to the extent that it does in the private, the paradigm case,
nevertheless, would seem to be consistent with what Robert A. Dahi
has called the "'normal' American political process," which is "one in
which there is a high probability that an active and legitimate group
in the population can make itself heard effectively at some crucial
stage in the process of decision,"54 for the union may be seen as little
more than an "active and legitimate group in the population." With
elections in the background to perform, as Mr. Dahl tells us, "the
critical role . . . in maximizing political equality and popular sov-
ereignty," 55 all seems well, at least theoretically, with collective bar-
gaining and public employment.
But there is trouble even in the house of theory if collective bar-
gaining in the public sector means what it does in the private. The
trouble is that if unions are able to withhold labor-to strike-as well
as to employ the usual methods of political pressure, they may possess
a disproportionate share of effective power in the process of decision.
Collective bargaining would then be so effective a pressure as to skew
the results of the "'normal' American political process."
One should straightway make plain that the strike issue is not
simply the essentiality of public services as contrasted with services or
products produced in the private sector. This is only half of the issue,
and in the past the half truth has beclouded analysis.50 The services
performed by a private transit authority are neither less nor more
essential to the public than those that would be performed if the
transit authority were owned by a municipality. A railroad or a dock
strike may be much more damaging to a community than "job action"
by teachers. This is not to say that governmental services are not
essential. They are, both because the demand for them is inelastic and
because their disruption may seriously injure a city's economy and
occasionally the physical welfare of its citizens. Nevertheless, essen-
tiality of governmental services is only a necessary part of, rather than
54. . DAHL, A PRUEACE TO DEmocRATIc TimORY 145 (1956).
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., S. SPERO, GOVERNMENT As EMPLOYER 1-15 (1948).
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a complete answer to, the question: What is wrong with strikes in
public employment?
What is wrong with strikes in public employment is that because
they disrupt essential services, a large part of a mayor's political con-
stituency will press for a quick end to the strike with little concern
for the cost of settlement. The problem is that because market re-
straints are attenuated and because public employee strikes cause in-
convenience to voters, such strikes too often succeed. Since other
interest groups with conflicting claims on municipal government do
not, as a general proposition, have anything approaching the effective-
ness of this union technique-or at least cannot maintain this relative
degree of power over the long run-they are put at a significant com-
petitive disadvantage in the political process. Where this is the case, it
must be said that the political process has been radically altered. And
because of the deceptive simplicity of the analogy to collective bargain-
ing in the private sector, the alteration may take place without any-
one realizing what has happened.
Therefore, while the purpose and effect of strikes by public em-
ployees may seem in the beginning merely designed to establish collec-
tive bargaining or to "catch up" with wages and fringe benefits in the
private sector, in the long run strikes must be seen as a means to re-
distribute income, or, put another way, to gain a subsidy for union
members,5 7 not through the employment of the usual types of political
pressure, but through the employment of what might appropriately
be called political force.
As is often the case when one generalizes, this picture may be thought
to be overdrawn. In order to refine analysis, it will be helpful to
distinguish between strikes that occur over monetary issues and strikes
involving non-monetary issues. The generalized picture sketched above
is essentially valid as to the former. Because there is usually no sub-
stitute for governmental services, the citizen-consumer faced with a
strike of teachers, or garbage men, or social workers is likely to be
seriously inconvenienced. This in turn places enormous pressure on
the mayor, who is apt to find it difficult to look to the long-run balance
sheet of the municipality. Most citizens are directly affected by a strike
57. Strikes in some areas of the private sector may have this effect, too. See note 45
supra. The difference in the impact of collective bargaining in the two sectors should be
seen as a continuum. Thus, for example, it may be that market restraints do not suffi.
ciently discipline strike settlements in some regulated industries, or in industries that
rely mainly on government contracts. If this is so-and we do not know that it is-perhaps
there should be tighter restraints on the use of the strike in those areas.
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of sanitation workers. Few, however, can decipher a municipal budget
or trace the relationship between today's labor settlement and next
year's increase in the mill rate. Thus, in the typical case the impact of
a settlement is less visible-or can more often be concealed-than the
impact of a disruption of services. Moreover, the cost of settlement
may be borne by a constituency much larger-the whole state or na-
tion-than that represented by the mayor. It follows that the mayor
usually will look to the electorate which is clamoring for a settlement,
and in these circumstances, the union's fear of a long strike, a major
check on its power in the private sector, is not a consideration.5s In the
face of all of these factors other interest groups with priorities different
from the union's are apt to be much less successful in their pursuit of
scarce tax dollars than is the union with power to withhold services.5
With respect to strikes over some non-monetary issues-decentraliza-
tion of the governance of schools might be an example-the intensity
of concern on the part of well-organized interest groups opposed to
the union's position would support the mayor in his resistance to
union demands. But even here, if union rank-and-file back their leader-
ship, the pressures for settlement from the general public, which may
be largely indifferent as to the underlying issue, would in time become
irresistible.60
VI. Sovereignty and Delegation Revisited
As applied to public employment, there is a concept of sovereignty
entitled to count as a reason for making strikes by public employees
illegal. For what sovereignty should mean in this field is not tie loca-
tion of ultimate authority-on that the critics are dead right-but the
right of government, through its laws, to ensure the survival of the
58. Contrast the situation in the private sector:
[A]anagement cannot normally win the short strike. Management can only win thelong strike. Also management frequently tends in fact to win the long strike. AS astrike lengthens, it commonly bears more heavily on the union and the emplo)eesthan on management. Strike relief is no substitute for a job. Even regular strikebenefits, which few unions can afford, and which usually exhaust the union treasuryquite rapidly (with some exceptions), are no substitute for a job.
Livernash, The Relation of Power to the Structure and Process of Collecthe Bargaining.
6 J. LAw & ECoN. 10, 15 (1963).
59. A vivid example would seem to be provided by recent experience in New Jersey.After a twelve hour strike by Newark firefighters on July 11, 1969, state urban aid funds,originally authorized for helping the poor, were diverted to salary increases for firemenand police. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1969, at 25, col. 7. Moreover, government decision-makers other than the mayor (e.g., the governor) may have interests different from themayor, interests which manifest themselves in pressures for settlement.
60. Consider also the effect of such strikes on the fabric of society. See, eg., M. M'IfAnT,THE TEAcRs STRIKE: NEW YoR., 1968 (1969).
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" 'normal' American political process." As hard as it may be for some
to accept, strikes by public employees may, as a long run proposition,
threaten that process.61
Moreover, it is our view-although this would seem to be much less
clear-that the public stake in some issues makes it appropriate for
government either not to have to bargain with its employees on these
issues at all62 or to follow bargaining procedures radically different
from those of the private sector. It is in this respect that the judicial
doctrine of illegal delegation of power should have relevance.
Consider, for example, the question of a public review board for
police; or, for that matter, the question of school decentralization.
These issues, viewed by the unions involved primarily as questions
of job security, engage the interest of so many disparate groups in a
relevant population, that it may be thought unfair to allow one group
-the police, the teachers-to exert pressure through collective bar-
gaining (quite apart from the strike) in which competing groups do
not directly participate as well as through the channels (e.g., lobbying)
open to other interest groups.63
Our hesitation in this area is caused by two factors. First, models
of the political process have trouble with fine-grained distinctions
about too much power. Given the vulnerability of most municipal em-
ployers, one can say with some confidence that the strike imparts too
much power to an interest group only because the distinction addressed
there is not fine-grained at all. Second, it is difficult indeed for any
governmental institution to make judgments about the issues that
should be included in the non-bargainable class. The courts are badly
suited to this task; and the legislature is not well constituted to come
in after the fact and effect a change. Nevertheless, limits will have to
be set or bargaining procedures radically changed, and this will in a
sense be giving content to the doctrine of delegation as it bears upon
the subject of public employment.
While there is increasing advocacy for expanding the scope of bar-
gaining in public employment and in favor of giving public employees
the right to strike-advocacy not just by unionists but by disinterested
61. It should be understood that this claim is with respect to the employment of the
strike once collective bargaining is established. In our opinion the opportunity for public
employees to organize and bargain through a union is compelled by the private sector
analogy and is consistent with the survival of the "normal American political process."
62. Compare Executive Order 10988, Employee-Management Cooperation in the Fed.
eral Service, 27 Fed. Reg. 551 (1962).
65. See also note 59 supra.
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experts as well " - the law generally limits the scope of bargaining and
forbids strikes.65 This is often done with little attention to supporting
reasons. Ours has been an attempt to supply these reasons and thereby
to give some legitimate content to sovereignty and delegation.
We do not, however, mean to suggest that legislatures should abdi-
cate to the courts the task of constructing a new system of collective
bargaining for the public sector through the elaboration of sovereignty
and delegation. Legislation is needed, for the problems we have ex-
plored require solutions beyond the power of the courts to fashion.
In the future, if strikes are to be barred, sophisticated impasse proce-
dures must be established. If, on the other hand, some strikes are to
be tolerated, changes in the political structure which will make the
municipal employer less vulnerable to work stoppages must be de-
veloped. And, in any event, legislative action will be necessary either
to separate out those non-monetary issues which might not be decided
solely through collective bargaining, or to change bargaining proce-
dures so that all interested groups may participate in the resolution of
such issues. These legislative choices and legal procedures will be the
subject of a forthcoming article.
64. See, e.g., Wollett, The Taylor Law and the Strike Ban, in Punuc EmmLOmYE ORGA-
NYZATION AND BA GAINDNG 29 (H. Anderson ed. 1968).
65. See, e.g., case and statutes cited in note 2 supra.
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